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Objectives: The Medicare Safety Net Policy was introduced in March 2004 to provide 
financial relief for those Australians who face high out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for 
outpatient medical services. This study evaluates the extent to which out-of-pocket costs 
have fallen since the introduction of the Safety Net and examines the impact of the policy 
on the level of service use, the amount of benefits paid by government and fees charged 
by medical providers. 
Methods: Regression modelling of time series data was used to examine whether there 
have been significant changes in levels of service use, fees charged and benefits paid for 
services provided by specialists in the two-year period following the introduction of the 
Safety Net. Four speciality fields were examined in this analysis: general specialists’ 
consultations, obstetrics, pathology and diagnostic imaging. 
Results: The analysis indicates that the introduction of the Safety Net coincided with a 
substantial rise in public funding for Medicare services and a much smaller reduction in 
OOP costs.  The policy has coincided with a small but significant change in the number 
of pathology and diagnostic imaging services used and in some specialty areas a 
substantial increase in the fees charged by providers. The net impact shows that for 
specialists’ consultations every dollar spent on the Medicare Safety Net, $0.68 went 
towards higher fees and $0.32 went towards reducing OOP costs. The corresponding 
figures for diagnostic imaging were $0.74 and $0.26 respectively. 
Conclusions: The Safety Net was heralded by the government as a fundamental 
reform in Australia’s Medicare program.  Whilst the Safety Net was introduced to help 
reduce out-of-pocket medical costs, this analysis shows that in its first two years of 
operation, there has been significant leakage of public funding towards higher provider 
fees. More research is needed using longer term data to assess the impact of the policy on 
patient and provider behaviour more widely, including examining the policy’s impact on 
those who did qualify for Safety Net and those who did not, as well as more 
disaggregated analysis of different Medicare services. 
 
 




1.  Introduction 
The Medicare Safety Net was introduced in early 2004 to provide additional financial 
relief for families with high out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses for Medicare funded 
outpatient services.  It is similar to catastrophic insurance in the sense that it only 
provides protection once a household has faced substantial OOP costs in any calendar 
year.  This paper examines what effect the introduction of the Safety Net has had on out-
of-pocket costs and its impact on health care use, public funding and fees charged by 
providers.  The first section of the paper provides some background of Australia’s health 
care financing arrangements, and provides some empirical context concerning OOP costs 
in Australia.  The paper then sets out the mechanisms of the Safety Net policy, before 
describing the methods, results and conclusions of the analysis.    
1.1 Australia’s health care financing: Medicare 
Since its introduction in 1984, Medicare has been a fundamental component of 
Australia’s public health care funding arrangements. The outpatient services subsidised 
by Medicare include consultations with general practitioners (GPs), psychiatrists, 
obstetricians and other specialists as well as diagnostic and therapeutic services. These 
services are largely privately provided (i.e. by independent, self-employed medical 
professionals) and providers are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis.  
Under the Medicare program, patients receive a subsidy worth 85% of the Medicare 
Schedule Fee for all eligible outpatient services (75% if the service is provided in an 
inpatient setting).  There are Schedule Fees for a wide range of medical services and 
these are nationally set by government. However, providers are not bound by nationally 
set Schedule Fees and can set fees at their own discretion and their right to set fees is 
widely regarded as constitutionally guaranteed [1].  Providers can even charge different 
patients different fees. 
Prior to the introduction of the Safety Net, Medicare could be defined as a “rear-end 
deductible” insurance program - where the public subsidy for each type of medical 
service was fixed and any fee charged above this level could only be met by patients 
directly through OOP costs.  Thus, patients have historically faced the burden of directly 
paying any charges above the Medicare subsidy and providers face market pressures to 
contain their fees. These pressures are seen as a major factor in keeping medical fee 
inflation – and therefore OOP costs - in check [1].  
In 2005, Australia’s federal government spent around AUD430 per capita on subsidies 
for Medicare-related services [2].   
1.2  Out-of-pocket costs in Australia 
By international standards Australia’s overall OOP costs are relatively high. In 2002, 
Australia ranked fourth (behind Switzerland, Greece and the United States) in terms of 
highest per-capita OOP expenditures out of 27 OECD countries for which comparable 
data was available. Australia’s per-capita OOP costs rose by 170%, in real terms, 
between 1985 and 2002 [3].    
 
OOP costs for Medicare outpatient services account for only ten percent of the overall 
OOP costs faced by patients directly – or around $1.43 billion in the 2002-03 financial 
year.  Other big cost items faced by patients include pharmaceuticals (33%) followed by 
health professionals such as dentists and allied-health (29%) [4].   
In recent years there have been substantial rises in Medicare-related OOP costs. Table 1 
shows that between 1986 and 1995 OOP costs for Medicare outpatient services overall 
fell by 0.5% (in real terms), but grew at a rate equivalent to 7.1% per annum between 
1995 and 2004 [4].   
INSERT TABLE 1 
Following this period of rapidly rising OOP expenses, the Australian Government 
introduced a package of measures, labelled Medicare Plus, designed to reduce OOP 
costs.  The package contained a number of initiatives directed mostly at the primary care 
market.  For more details on these measures see Jones et al [5].  As part of the Medicare 
Plus package, the Federal Government also implemented the Medicare Safety Net in 
March 2004 which encompassed all Medicare subsidised outpatient services, not just 
primary care services [6].  
It should be noted that we excluded general practice consultations from this analysis.  
There are two reasons for doing so.  Firstly, the Medicare Plus package contained a raft 
of measures directed at reducing OOP costs for primary care.  These measures were 
implemented around the same time as the Safety Net. It therefore becomes difficult to 
isolate the impact of the Safety Net on this sector of the health care market.  This is not 
an issue for the speciality fields included in this analysis where the only major policy 
reform in 2004 and 2005 was the introduction of the Safety Net.  Secondly, previous 
research has shown that only 10% of Safety Net benefits are directed to the general 
practice market, with the remaining 90% directed to specialty fields [7]. 
1.3   The Medicare Safety Net 
The objective of the Medicare Safety Net policy is to provide catastrophic insurance for 
those individuals and households with high OOP costs [8].  Once annual OOP expenses 
exceed a certain threshold, the Safety Net reimburses patients 80% of all OOP costs for 
Medicare eligible outpatient services.  Each family member’s OOP expenditure is 
counted towards the family’s Safety Net threshold and the count starts afresh on the 1 
January of each year. See Box 1 for an example of how the Safety Net works. It should 
be noted that whilst Medicare provides subsidies for outpatient and private inpatient 
service, the Medicare Safety Net only covers OOP payments incurred for outpatient 
services.  Hence, the focus of this paper is on outpatient services. 
When the policy commenced, the threshold for low to middle income households was 
AUD300, and AUD700 for all other households.  A family with two children under the 
age of 13 will be eligible for the lower threshold if their pre-tax annual household income 
is less than AUD101,495 (USD71,490).  The government estimated that around 12 











The Safety Net represents a major change in public funding arrangements with resulting 
potential impacts on the behaviour of patients and providers. For the first time, coverage 
has been expanded beyond the schedule fee and, as a result, health care costs that were 
previously uninsurable (neither publicly nor privately) are now publicly subsidised.  
Under these new funding arrangements providers could increase their fees in the 
knowledge that patients will now only face 20% of those costs once the Safety Net 
threshold has been reached, and patients may utilise more services, or more expensive 
services knowing that once the threshold has been reached, 80% of subsequent costs are 
covered by the Safety Net.   The Safety Net may also affect where services are delivered.  
For example, it would be feasible for some procedures that were conducted as an 
inpatient service may be shifted to an outpatient setting.  This could result in better 
insurance coverage to the patient because the Safety Net covers fees charged above the 
Medicare Schedule.  Providers may also change their billing practice and ‘load’ some of 
their fees (such as administrative charges) onto Medicare, so that patients can claim these 
via the Safety Net.   
When the Safety Net was introduced, it was estimated that approximately 450,000 
individuals and families would benefit in the first year at a cost to the Australian 
Government of $440 million over the four financial years between 2003 and 2007.  
However, more than 600,000 individuals and families actually qualified for benefits in 
the first year and that OOP costs were significantly higher than first expected, leading the 
Government to revise its Safety Net commitments, bringing the total cost to overAUD1 
billion over the four years to June 2007 [9]. 
In response to the larger than expected growth of Safety Net expenditure, the Federal 
Government announced changes to the qualifying thresholds in the May 2005 budget.  As 
of 1 January 2006, the thresholds rose to $500 (up from $300) for low and middle income 
households and $1,000 (up from $700) for everyone else [8]. 
This study examines the impact of the Safety Net during the 2004 and 2005 calendar 
years.  This period saw the introduction of the policy and finishes just prior to the raising 
of the thresholds on 1 January 2006.  The study examines temporal changes in fees, 
benefits and OOP costs following the introduction of the Safety Net. It focuses on 
whether the trends in the number of services and fees charged are consistent with the 
notion of greater moral hazard following the introduction of the Safety Net.   
The analysis examines trends in four specialty areas; specialist consultations, obstetric 
services, diagnostic imaging and pathology services.   
Box 1: The Medicare Safety Net – an example 
 
The Smith family is a low income household and are therefore eligible for the $300 
Medicare Safety Net threshold.  
 
Let’s say Mr Smith sees a specialist and is charged $150 for the consultation.  The Medicare 
Schedule Fee for that service is $74 and therefore Mr Smith receives a rebate of $63 (85% 
of $74).  Mr Smith’s out-of-pocket payment is $87 ($150 fee minus $63 rebate). That $87 
will count towards the family’s Safety Net threshold.  
 
Once the family reaches the $300 threshold through their collective out-of-pocket expenses, 
the Medicare Safety Net will cover 80% of all subsequent out-of-pocket costs incurred 
through the use of Medicare outpatient services. 
 
Let’s say the Smiths have reached their threshold and Mr Smith has another specialist 
consultation.  Once again he is charged $150.  The Medicare rebate is still $63, but now the 
Safety Net will cover 80% of the remaining $87.  Therefore Mr Smith’s OOP will be $17.40 
and the government will pay $59.60 in Safety Net benefits in addition to the Medicare 
benefit of $63.   
  
 
2.  Methods 
We examine whether the introduction of the Safety Net coincided with any significant 
changes in the number of medical services used, the level of fees charged, government 
benefits paid or amount of OOP costs incurred, using national Medicare data.   
2.1  Data 
Data used in this analysis are reported quarterly by the Department of Health and Ageing 
(see [2]).  The Department reports the quarterly amount of benefits paid by the 
government for Medicare related services, the number of services utilised, the fees 
charged and the OOP costs.  Furthermore, the Department categorises and reports the 
data by eight broad professional groups: general practice consultations, specialists’ 
attendances, obstetrics, pathology, diagnostic imaging, anaesthetics, operations and 
‘other’.   
We used quarterly data dating back to 1993 to ensure that we accounted for long term 
trends in the Medicare data.  This data was obtained from the National Social Health 
Statistical Database, Healthwiz [10].  The Safety Net policy came into effect during the 
first quarter of 2004, resulting in eight quarters’ worth data and enabled us to examine the 
impact of the Safety Net against the long term trends.  All dollar values were adjusted to 
2005 price levels, using the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
time series data [11]. 
The Safety Net policy only covers outpatient services and we therefore excluded 
operations and anaesthetics from the analysis because these services are predominantly 
provided on an inpatient basis.  We excluded the ‘other’ category because of our inability 
to make an assessment on whether these services are provided on an inpatient or 
outpatient basis. As mentioned earlier we also excluded general practice consultations. 
After these exclusions, four specialty fields for which data are routinely reported remain; 
specialists’ consultations, obstetrics, pathology and diagnostic imaging services.  The vast 
majority of these services are provided in the outpatient (i.e. for patients who have not 
been admitted to hospital) setting and therefore are eligible for Safety Net benefits. 
However, it should be noted that data on the number of services provided, fees charged 
and benefits paid can potentially include those that are provided in an inpatient setting.  
Obstetrics is where we would expect a sizeable number of services provided on an 
inpatient basis.   This should not have a significant bearing on the interpretation of the 
results unless there has been a substantial shift between the number of outpatient and 
inpatient billed services since the introduction of the Medicare Safety Net.  Whilst we 
have no evidence that this is the case, it too could be seen as an impact of the Safety Net.   
The data reported by the Department does separate the OOP costs for outpatient services 
only, enabling us to observe these changes directly.  
2.2   Estimation 
For each of the four speciality areas, regression models were used to assess whether the 
introduction of Safety Net coincided with significant changes in (1) number of services 
per capita, (2) average fee per service, (3) average government benefit paid per service 
and (4) average OOP costs per outpatient service over time and (5) average OOP cost per  
 
service over time (outpatient and inpatient combined).  Separate regressions of the form 
shown in equation 1 were run for each of these five dependent variables. Hence, there are 
20 regression models in all (4 speciality areas * 5 dependent variables).  
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The dependent variable  q V denotes quarterly data on each of the five indicators of interest 
listed above and s denotes the speciality area.    q T  takes the value of 1 to 52 for each 
quarter between 1993 and 2005; Q indicates the quarter of the calendar year, taking the 
values of 1 to 4.  Two dummy variables ( 04 SND  and  05 SND ) indicate the start of the 
Safety Net policy and the start of the calendar year where a person’s OOP cost threshold 
count goes back to zero.  04 05 SNQ  and  SNQ  take the value of 1 to 4 to indicate the quarter 
in 2004 and 2005 respectively.   Coefficients on the Safety Net quarter variables estimate 
the impact of the Safety Net as the calendar year progresses and more people qualify for 
Safety Net benefits.  The model also includes up to three time variables to account for 
significant changes in fees and OOP costs in 1995 and 2000.  These variables were 
included to ensure the models accurately reflect past trends and ensure that these past 
changes were not wrongly attributed to the Safety Net policy.  
The intention of the Safety Net policy was to reduce the OOP costs of patients through 
increased public spending.  Hence, if the Safety Net policy was operating as intended, we 
would expect at least one positive Safety Net coefficient for models of government 
benefits, at least one negative coefficient for models of OOP costs, but no significant 
impact Safety Net coefficients for the models that examine fees and services.   
3.  Results 
We report the results for the number of services used per capita, fees charged by 
providers, government benefits, OOP costs for Medicare outpatient services and OOP 
costs for Medicare outpatient and inpatient services combined in Tables 2 to 6 
respectively.  We then estimated the difference between the long term trend and change 
following the introduction of the Safety Net for the fees charged by providers, 
government benefits paid and OOP costs.  The results of these estimations are shown in 
Figures 1 to 3 for each of the specialty areas for which we found statistically significant 
results in our models.   
3.1   Number of Services used 
The results in Table 2 indicate that the introduction of the Safety Net in 2004 did not 
appear to have had an impact on the number of services used.  Collectively, the Safety 
Net variable coefficients suggest that that service use has increased since the introduction 
of the Safety net, however most are not significantly different from zero.  Only in the area 
of pathology and diagnostic imaging did 2005 quarter variable (SNQ05) reach some 
significance (p<0.10), indicating that the introduction of the Safety Net coincided with a 
gradual increase in use over the course of the 2005 calendar year.   
INSERT TABLE 2  
 
3.2  Fees charged by providers 
Table 3 shows the regression results for fees charged by providers.  Specialists appear to 
have introduced small but statistically insignificant fee rises as the 2004 calendar year 
progressed. Put together, however, these small rises were significant as indicated by the 
SND05 dummy variable (p=0.097).  The obstetric area witnessed the most dramatic 
increases, with large and significant fee rises recorded in 2004 and smaller, but still 
significant, rises during 2005.  There were also small but significant rises in the fees 
charged for diagnostic imaging throughout 2004 – but fees appear to have stabilised in 
2005.  There were no significant changes in the pathology fees.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
3.3 Government benefits paid 
Table 4 provides evidence that following the introduction of Safety Net, the amount of 
public funding through government benefits rose significantly for three out of four 
speciality fields.  The results in Table 4 provide strong evidence of the cumulative impact 
that the Safety Net has on government benefits as the year progresses.  That is, as the year 
progresses and more people qualify for the Safety Net, government benefits per service 
rise (as indicated by the positive coefficients for the SNQ04 and SNQ05variables).  It 
should be noted that this quarterly trend was not present prior to the introduction of the 
Safety Net (as indicated by the statistically insignificant result for the “Quarter”, Q, 
variable). 
INSERT TABLE 4 
3.4 OOP costs – Medicare outpatient services 
Table 5 presents the results for OOP payments for outpatient services only.  The average 
OOP payment per outpatient service fell significantly for specialists’ consultations and 
diagnostic imaging services as the calendar year progresses (as indicated by negative 
coefficients for the SNQ04 and SNQ05 variables). The results also show that OOP costs 
increased significantly throughout 2004 but the trend in 2005 shows a small and 
significant fall as the calendar year progressed. The rise in OOP costs for obstetric 
services can at least be partially explained by a change in billing practices rather than a 
real increase in OOP costs.  This is discussed more fully below.  There were no 
significant changes in OOP payments for pathology services.  Again, the model shows 
evidence of the expected Safety Net pattern with OOP payments falling as the calendar 
year progresses. The pattern in OOP payments shows an inverse relationship with the 
government benefits paid, providing evidence of the shift from private OOP finance to 
public financing. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
3.5 OOP costs – Medicare outpatient and inpatient services combined 
Table 6 shows the trends in OOP costs for the four medical speciality areas but for 
outpatient and inpatient services combined. The sign and significance of the coefficients 
are similar to the results found in Table 5.   The size of the coefficients in Tables 5 and 6  
 
are also similar for three of the four speciality areas, confirming the dominance of 
services provided on an outpatient basis in these fields.  Only in obstetrics is there a 
significant deviation between OOP costs provided on an outpatient basis and an inpatient 
basis.  OOP costs for obstetric outpatient services have risen whereas costs for inpatient 
appear to have fallen.  Possible reasons for this phenomenon will be discussed below. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
The results in Tables 2 to 6 suggest that the Safety Net policy has increased government 
spending through higher benefits paid per service – as would be expected.  This increased 
spending appears to have reduced out-of-pocket costs but it has also coincided with 
increases in the level of fees charged by some medical providers.  The question that arises 
from this for the Safety Net policy is how much of the increase in government spending 
has translated into reduced OOP costs for patients and how much of it has gone towards 
higher fees? That is, how efficient has the Safety Net policy has been in reducing OOP 
costs for patients, or has there been significant “leakage” in the form of higher fees?   
3.6   Estimated monetary impact of the Safety Net on fees, 
government benefit and OOP costs  
Figures 1 to 3 estimate changes in the fees charged, benefits paid and out-of-pocket costs 
post 2004.  They show the difference between the models’ predicted value following the 
introduction of the Safety Net and the predicted values had the Safety Net not been 
introduced using the trends established prior to its introduction.  This estimate was 
derived by estimating the predicted value with the full time series models (as per equation 
1) for the 2004 and 2005 calendar years and then subtracting the predicted value of the 
same model but without the Safety Net variables. This procedure was repeated to 
estimate changes in the average government benefit paid, fee charged and OOP cost per 
service after the introduction of the Safety Net.   Out-of-pocket cost per service was 
estimated twice: once based on outpatient data only and once on outpatient and inpatient 
data combined.  Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the quarterly impact for each of the three medical 
fields for which significant results were found (hence excluding pathology). 
Figure 1 shows the changes in fees charged, government benefits and OOP costs for 
specialists’ consultations in each quarter following the introduction of the Medicare 
Safety Net.   It shows that the average government benefit per service increased and 
continues to rise as the calendar year progresses.  Fees rose steadily during the 2004 
calendar year but have remained steady throughout 2005.  In the final quarter of 2005, 
government benefits had increased by $7.59 per service, fees increased by $4.13 which 
meant that OOP costs fell by $3.46.  In general, the rise in government benefits were 
generally larger than the rise in fees, meaning that OOP costs fell. When calculating this 
over the entire period, the model estimates that for every dollar spent on the Medicare 
Safety Net during 2004 and 2005, $0.68 effectively went towards higher medical 
specialists fees and $0.32 went towards reducing OOP costs.  Figure 1 also shows that 
OOP costs actually rose in the first quarter of 2005.  This corresponds with the Safety Net 
policy, where the threshold counts starts afresh on the 1 January 2006 and fewer people 
are eligible for Safety Net benefits.    
INSERT FIGURE 1  
 
Figure 2 illustrates changes for obstetric services. The model estimated that government 
benefits rose significantly in 2004 and 2005 and these rises were almost matched by 
increased fees.  This resulted in only very small reductions in OOP costs overall and even 
significant increases for outpatient OOP costs.  The fact that the two OOP curves deviate 
from each other provides some indication of changes in billing practices.  This makes it 
more difficult to offer any firm conclusions on the impact of the Safety Net on OOP costs 
in obstetrics (to be discussed below). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
Figure 3 reveals the estimated changes for diagnostic imaging services.   This medical 
field witnessed significant rises in government benefits in 2004 and 2005.  Fees rose 
significantly in 2004 and kept rising in 2005 albeit at a slower pace.  The rise in 
government benefits were slightly greater than the fee increases meaning that OOP costs 
fell but only marginally.  For the diagnostic imaging sector, we estimated that for every 
dollar spent on the Safety Net, $0.74 went towards higher fees and $0.26 went towards 
reducing OOP costs. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that there has been a small rise in the number of 
services used since the introduction of the Safety Net.  In particular, the number of per 
capita services appear to be increasing in 2005 for each of the four medical fields studied 
here, but were only significant for pathology and diagnostic imaging services.  This 
finding provides some evidence of the Safety Net’s seasonal effect; as the calendar year 
progresses more people qualify for the Safety Net, face fewer OOP costs and therefore 
use more services.  The impact of the Safety Net on the number of services used is 
therefore consistent with moral hazard expectations although its impact, thus far, appears 
to be low.  It will be important to monitor this over the longer term, and in less aggregate 
form by examining more specific medical services.    
Time series analysis shows that the introduction of the Safety Net policy led to 
substantial rises in the average government benefit paid per service.  This rise in 
government spending has been partially matched by higher fees. This trend was 
statistically significant for three of the four professional groups studied here (pathology 
services being the exception).  The results provide important evidence on the inflationary 
impact of the Safety Net and are certainly consistent with the presence of provider moral 
hazard.  
Whilst obstetrics witnessed the most dramatic changes, the results need to be interpreted 
with care.  One suggested explanation for the dramatic rise in fees charged is that the 
‘booking fee’ associated with obstetric services (which was previously paid directly by 
patients) has now been loaded onto Medicare items, thereby transferring this cost from 
the patient to Medicare [12] and hence making it eligible for Safety Net benefits.  The 
effect of this practice is that, for the first time, the ‘booking fee’ appears in the Medicare 
data and this may artificially inflate the fee charged data.   To the extent that this 
happened it means that the ‘booking fee’ is now substantially paid for by the Medicare  
 
Safety Net and, as a result, public funding for privately provided obstetric services has 
increased substantially.   
One other distinguishing feature in the field of obstetrics is that OOP costs for outpatient 
services differed markedly from the OOP costs for inpatient and outpatient services 
combined.  This observation could again be explained by changes in the fees charged 
between the two service settings. It may be the case that some of the fees that were 
previously charged on an inpatient basis are now being charged as outpatient services.  
That is, fees for outpatient services have risen but these may have been partly offset by 
the reduction in fees for inpatient services and therefore OOP costs.     
This phenomenon may be occurring in other medical fields also.  Indeed, one of 
limitations of this study is our inability to disaggregate data for services provided both on 
an inpatient and outpatient basis – although we do have data on the OOP costs for 
outpatient services only.  This means that some of our other findings may be attributable 
to changes in doctors’ billing practices.  For example, it is feasible that some services 
may have been shifted from an inpatient setting to an outpatient setting. This would mean 
that the service attracts a higher Medicare subsidy; instead of paying 75% of the 
Medicare Schedule fee for inpatient services, the government will pay 85% for the same 
service if it is provided in an outpatient setting.  Importantly, this change from inpatient 
to outpatient setting means that the service becomes eligible for Safety Net benefits.  To 
the extent that this practice is occurring, it could still be considered to be a Safety Net 
effect – albeit an indirect effect.   
Due to data limitations, we can only report on average changes in fees, government 
benefits and OOP costs per service but we can not say anything about the distribution of 
these changes.   Hence, we do not know to what extent the Safety Net has had an impact 
on the general population (or indeed particular sub-group of patients) versus those that 
have qualified for the Safety Net.  Due to the way the policy operates it is likely that for 
those who qualified, the Safety Net provided substantial protection for OOP costs.  One 
possible implication of this is that for those who did not qualify, OOP costs may have 
increased by a greater amount than is indicated in this analysis.  This would indeed be the 
case, unless providers were able to discriminate and increase their fees to only those 
patients who qualified for the Safety Net. This may be plausible for some speciality areas 
where the provider is aware of the OOP costs a patient may accrue during the year (e.g. in 
obstetrics), but is unlikely to be the case in other areas such as diagnostic imaging or 
specialists’ consultations. 
As noted previously, the Australian Government has initiated several measures to try and 
counter some of the unintended effects of the Safety Net.  Most significantly, the 
government has raised the annual Safety Net thresholds.  Whilst this change may reduce 
the fiscal burden on the government it is also likely that services with high OOP costs 
such as obstetrics may take even greater proportions of Safety Net spending.   
Furthermore, there remains the important question over the permanency of the observed 
fee rises.  If they are permanent, then OOP costs will now be even higher for more people 
who never qualified (or now no longer qualify) for the Safety Net. 
Another measure initiated by the government is to exclude 59 Medicare items from 
Safety Net eligibility.  These items were chosen on the basis that they should be provided 
to hospital inpatients and not outpatients.  This last initiative confirms that the 
government was concerned about the potential changes in provider billing practice where  
 
patients were still being treated in hospital but no longer being admitted to hospital – 
therefore making them technically outpatients and eligible for Safety Net benefits. 
Despite its fairly modest expenditure, adding only 1.5% to the overall Medicare budget, 
the Safety Net represents an important structural change to Australia’s health care 
financing arrangements.  For the first time, public funds are used to subsidise patients’ 
medical care costs beyond the nationally set Medicare Schedule Fee.  Providers have also 
maintained their right to set fees at their own discretion.  In this context, the Safety Net 
has had a significant affect on the financial incentives faced by both patients and 
providers.  This paper provides the first preliminary evidence of the impact that these 
incentive changes has had on the use of services and the fees charged for those services.  
The results suggest that the Safety Net has had an inflationary impact on the fees charged 
by medical providers.  This has caused significant ‘policy leakage’, where substantial 
amounts of Safety Net benefits have effectively flowed to providers rather than patients. 
The results in this paper indicate that the Safety Net can be regarded as catastrophic 
insurance in more sense than one. 
  
 
Table 1: Average growth in out-of-pocket cost per Medicare outpatient services by 
broad professional group – per annum, constant dollars 
  GP  Specialists  Obstetrics  Pathology  Diagnostic 
Imaging 
Total 
1986-1995  -3.2%  3.1%  -4.2%  -0.5%  2.5%  -0.5% 
1995-2004  13.4%  8.0%  12.1%  -6.5%  6.3%  7.1% 
 
Table 2: Trends in the number of per capita Medicare services 








0.00221**  -0.00001  0.0068***  0.0008***  Time 1993 (Tq) 
(0.00090)  (0.00016)  (0.00045)  (0.00013) 
0.00452***  -0.00026  -0.0050*  0.0005  Quarter (Q) 
(0.00109)  (0.00018)  (0.00300)  (0.00089) 
-0.00495  -0.00047  -0.0366  -0.0119  SN dummy '04 (SND04) 
(0.01080)  (0.00183)  (0.02990)  (0.00887) 
-0.01171  0.00017  -0.0261  -0.0051  SN dummy '05 (SND05) 
(0.01387)  (0.00235)  (0.03849)  (0.01141) 
0.00205  0.00030  0.0128  0.0022  SN Quarter '04 (SNQ04) 
(0.00374)  (0.00063)  (0.01037)  (0.00307) 
0.00505  0.00030  0.0198*  0.0052*  SN Quarter '05 (SNQ05) 
(0.00374)  (0.00063)  (0.01037)  (0.00307) 
  0.00762***      Dummy 1996 (D96) 
  (0.00094)     
-0.00198*  0.00016      Time 1995 (T95) 
(0.00104)  (0.00018)     
0.00020  -0.00019  0.0035  0.0005  Time 2000 (T00) 
(0.00048)  (0.00010)  (0.00116)  (0.00034) 
0.21582***  0.01059***  0.5882  0.1300***  Constant (f f f f) 
(0.00602)  (0.00104)  (0.01084)  (0.00322) 
Adjusted R2  0.5449  0.8988  0.9695  0.8472 
Note: * P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.001 
  
 
Table 3:  Trends in provider fees  








-0.361***  -4.939***  -0.053***  0.369*** 
Time 1993 (Tq) 
(0.101)  (0.828)  (0.0091)  (0.0430) 
-0.156  1.290  -0.050  -0.035 
Quarter (Q) 
(0.122)  (0.928)  (0.0606)  (0.2858) 
1.558  -27.548***  0.611  0.389 
SN dummy '04 (SND04) 
(1.215)  (9.227)  (0.6048)  (2.8513) 
2.645*  55.544***  0.676  8.485** 
SN dummy '05 (SND05) 
(1.561)  (11.844)  (0.7784)  (3.6700) 
0.447  18.971***  0.231  1.878* 
SN Quarter '04 (SNQ04) 
(0.420)  (3.189)  (0.2097)  (0.9885) 
-0.017  7.318**  0.119  0.363 
SN Quarter '05 (SNQ05) 
(0.420)  (3.189)  (0.2097)  (0.9885) 
  -98.523***     
Dummy 1996 (D96) 
  (4.730)     
0.347**  4.630***     
Time 1995 (T95) 
(0.117)  (0.893)     
0.157**  3.254***  -0.094***  -0.629*** 
Time 2000 (T00) 
(0.054)  (0.496)  (0.0234)  (0.1104) 
77.781***  217.384***  24.303***  112.198*** 
Constant (f f f f) 
(0.677)  (5.225)  (0.2193)  (1.0340) 
Adjusted R2  0.855  0.981  0.888  0.765 
Note: * P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.001 
  
 










-0.292***  -3.147***  -0.002  0.359***  Time 1993 (Tq) 
(0.068)  (0.523)  (0.007)  (0.043) 
0.041  0.715  -0.057  0.082  Quarter (Q) 
(0.083)  (0.586)  (0.047)  (0.289) 
-0.457  -25.671***  0.508  -0.219  SN dummy '04 (SND04) 
(0.820)  (5.833)  (0.470)  (2.882) 
3.292**  46.234***  0.793  9.784**  SN dummy '05 (SND05) 
(1.054)  (7.487)  (0.604)  (3.709) 
1.669***  19.367***  0.262  2.855**  SN Quarter '04 (SNQ04) 
(0.284)  (2.016)  (0.163)  (0.999) 
1.189***  12.315***  0.156  1.408  SN Quarter '05 (SNQ05) 
(0.284)  (2.016)  (0.163)  (0.999) 
  -57.388***      Dummy 1996 (D96) 
  (2.990)     
0.158*  2.904***      Time 1995 (T95) 
(0.079)  (0.565)     
-0.135**  0.923**  -0.144***  -1.055***  Time 2000 (T00) 
(0.037)  (0.313)  (0.018)  (0.112) 
63.643***  128.921***  21.291***  98.133*** 
Constant (f f f f) 
(0.457)  (3.303)  (0.170)  (1.045) 
Adjusted R2  0.938  0.981  0.839  0.654 
Note: * P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.001 
  
 










-0.058  -0.218*  -0.064***  -0.009  Time 1993 (Tq) 
(0.053)  (0.109)  (0.003)  (0.015) 
0.103  0.098  -0.037*  0.022  Quarter (Q) 
(0.065)  (0.122)  (0.020)  (0.097) 
3.446***  -5.040***  0.077  1.029  SN dummy '04 (SND04) 
(0.642)  (1.216)  (0.196)  (0.971) 
-0.571  29.970***  -0.131  -1.349  SN dummy '05 (SND05) 
(0.824)  (1.561)  (0.252)  (1.250) 
-1.786***  4.613***  -0.009  -1.187**  SN Quarter '04 (SNQ04) 
(0.222)  (0.420)  (0.068)  (0.337) 
-1.765***  -2.655***  0.016  -1.246**  SN Quarter '05 (SNQ05) 
(0.222)  (0.420)  (0.068)  (0.337) 
  1.735**      Dummy 1996 (D96) 
  (0.623)     
0.174**  0.293**      Time 1995 (T95) 
(0.062)  (0.118)     
0.256***  0.211**  0.042***  0.431***  Time 2000 (T00) 
(0.029)  (0.065)  (0.008)  (0.038) 
12.022***  9.655***  3.135***  11.460*** 
Constant (f f f f) 
(0.357)  (0.689)  (0.071)  (0.352) 
Adjusted R2  0.983  0.984  0.964  0.935 
Note: * P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.001 
  
 










-0.069*  -1.791***  -0.050***  0.010  Time 1993 (Tq) 
(0.040)  (0.339)  (0.003)  (0.014) 
-0.197***  0.575  0.005  -0.116  Quarter (Q) 
(0.049)  (0.380)  (0.018)  (0.096) 
2.023***  -1.871  0.096  0.619  SN dummy '04 (SND04) 
(0.485)  (3.779)  (0.177)  (0.955) 
-0.658  9.314*  -0.118  -1.302  SN dummy '05 (SND05) 
(0.623)  (4.851)  (0.227)  (1.229) 
-1.226***  -0.400  -0.029  -0.981**  SN Quarter '04 (SNQ04) 
(0.168)  (1.306)  (0.061)  (0.331) 
-1.206***  -5.002***  -0.035  -1.046**  SN Quarter '05 (SNQ05) 
(0.168)  (1.306)  (0.061)  (0.331) 
  -41.136***      Dummy 1996 (D96) 
  (1.937)     
0.189***  1.725***      Time 1995 (T95) 
(0.047)  (0.366)     
0.292***  2.331***  0.050***  0.426***  Time 2000 (T00) 
(0.022)  (0.203)  (0.007)  (0.037) 
14.138***  88.453***  3.018***  14.063*** 
Constant (f f f f) 
(0.270)  (2.140)  (0.064)  (0.346) 
Adjusted R2  0.990  0.981  0.926  0.939 
Note: * P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.001 






































Figure 3:  Changes in the mean benefit paid, fee charged and OOP payment per 
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